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COMMENT
INTERIOR TURNS OFF TAP FOR WILDERNESS AREAS
WILDERNESS ACT / WATER LAW-The Wilderness Act's purposes are secondary; federal wilderness lands do not carry federal
reserved water rights. 1988 Interior Solicitor Opinion.
INTRODUCTION

Whether wilderness areas reserved under the Wilderness Act of 1964
carry implied federal reserved water rights' is a hotly debated issue. The
question pits environmentalists against developers and raises the specter
of the federal government intervening in water allocation systems, which
many believe should be left to state governments. Images of fish and
wildlife perishing in dried up wilderness areas because of the federal
government's failure to claim federal reserved water rights loom in the
minds of many.
Even. though the images of dried up wilderness areas may be more
illusory than real,' the question of federal reserved water rights for will. Under the doctrine of federal reserved water rights, when the federal government withdraws
and reserves lands from the public domain for specific purposes, the withdrawal carries with it
sufficient water to sustain the purposes of the reservation. The courts have recognized that Congress
has the power to explicitly or implicitly reserve water and has upheld federal reserved water rights
in a number of different contexts-rights for Indian reservations as well as for power dams. Under
the doctrine, if a water right is recognized, it vests as of the date of the specific land reservation.
2. See, e.g., introduction to Abrams, Water in the Western Wilderness: The Duty toAssert Reserved
Water Rights, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 387. As to the question of whether the federal government has
a duty to assert these rights see also, Comment, The Duty of Agencies to Assert Reserved Water
Rights in Wilderness Areas, 14 Ecology L. Q. 639 (1987) (authored by Jason Marks).
3. The practical implications of federal reserved water rights for wilderness areas must take into
account that most wilderness areas are located in western states, and that generally, water rights in
those states are determined by the prior appropriation system. Under the prior appropriation system,
the first water user in time has rights senior to a subsequent water user. Thus, the date of the vesting
of the water right may be significant.
Given that most wilderness areas are located at the headwaters of streams, the question arises
why federal reserved water rights need to be asserted for wilderness areas at all. When the wilderness
area is located downstream, there are valid reasons for asserting the right-stopping the upstream
development of a mine or of an irrigtion dam which may be injurious to the wilderness' water rightbut the federal right may be useless if it is a right which vested after the stream was fully adjudicated
or if it is, at best, a junior right. Two scenarios of downstream wilderness areas, however, make
the federal right significant: (1) where the senior water rights are below the wilderness area and the
senior user wants to transfer or sell the rights to an upstream user; and (2) where the senior water
rights are above the wilderness area and the senior user wants to change the character of its use. In
both cases, the transfer or change in use may be harmful to the wilderness area in question. Under
the law of most prior appropriation states, a transfer or change in use of water rights will be denied
if it causes injury to existing water rights, even junior rights; thus, the wilderness area with a federal
reserve water right will be able to veto this kind of potentially damaging development. For a
description of concrete examples of conflicts between wilderness and other water uses and the effects
of possible federal reserved water rights, see, Comment, supra note 2, at 551-654.
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derness areas is nonetheless a political issue that cannot be ignored.' One
author suggests that these are water rights that environmentalists assert
in conjunction with their efforts to designate new wilderness areas and
water rights that state rights activists and developers contest, primarily
because they are being asserted by environmental interests. 5
In recent years environmental groups have asked the courts to enforce
the perceived duty of the federal government to assert water rights for
wilderness areas. In 1985, the Sierra Club filed a lawsuit in federal district
court in Colorado against officials of the Departments of Agriculture and
the Interior, claiming, among other things, that the officials were remiss
in not claiming federal reserved water rights for wilderness areas in
Colorado. 6 The Sierra Club v. Block court found that federal water rights
were reserved in wilderness areas pursuant to the Wilderness Act of 1964.'
The federal court's conclusion was in accordance with Interior Solicitor
Leo Krulitz's 1979 opinion Federal Water Rights of the National Park
Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation and Bureau
of Land Management. Krulitz briefly discussed the water rights of wilderness areas, concluding that the Wilderness Act of 1964 carried implicit
federal reserved water rights.9
Responding to the conflicting political views, Interior Solicitor Ralph
W. Tarr reversed interior policy on whether the Department of the Interior
should file claims for these rights. In a memorandum issued on July 26,
1988, " and approved by the United States attorney general," Solicitor
Tarr concluded that Congress did not intend to create federal reserved
water rights when it enacted the Wilderness Act of 1964. 2 Based largely
on an analysis of certain provisions of the Wilderness Act and its legislative history, the solicitor concluded that the Wilderness Act specifically
disclaimed new reserved water rights and that wilderness purposes were
4. For a description of some of the political ramifications of the issue, see generally Leshy, Water
and WildernesslLaw and Politics. 23 Land & Water L. Rev. 389 (1988) and Comment, Federal
Reserved Water Rights inWilderness Areas: A Progress Report on a Western Water Fight, 15 Hastings
Const. L. Q. 125 (1987) (authored by Janice 1. Weis).
5. Leshy, supra note 4, at 395-406. Leshy gives an excellent description of the concerns of
environmentalists, as well as of developers and state rights activists.
6. Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842 (1985), enforced and modified sub nom. Sierra Club
v. Lyng, 661 F Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 1987). The Sierra Club asserted the federal officials should
have claimed federal reserved water rights for 24 wilderness areas in Colorado.
7. Id.
8. 86 Interior Dec. 553 (1979) [hereinafter Krulitz Opinion].
9. Id. at 609-10. The opinion stated that the uses of these rights were restricted to "the maintenance
of minimum stream flows and lake levels ... and water required for ecological maintenance." Id.
at 610.
10. M-36914 (Supp. 1l), United States Department of the Interior [hereinafter Solicitor's Opinion].
It. Letter from Attorney General Edwin Meese IIto Donald P. Hodel, Secretary of the Department
of the Interior (July 28, 1988).
12. Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1131-36 (1982)).
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secondary to the purposes of underlying reservations, whether national
parks or national forests. 3
This note will examine the basis for Solicitor Tarr's conclusions. It
will consider whether the conclusions are the only possible ones in light
of the solicitor's heavy reliance on legislative intent and legislative history. The note will then contrast Solicitor Tarr's conclusions with the
differing conclusions in Sierra Club v. Block and Sierra Club v. Lyng.' 4
The note will conclude with an evaluation of the impact of this opinion
on the battle of environmentalists against developers and state rights
activists.
THE FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS DOCTRINE
The doctrine of federal reserved water rights was judicially created.
Its foundation was laid in UnitedStates v. Rio GrandeDam and Irrigation
Co. 5 In that case the United States sought to enjoin the construction of
an irrigation dam across the Rio Grande. 6 In discussing the issue of a
state's power over its streams, and its power to adjudicate the water rights
to those streams, the Court found that "in the absence of specific authority
from Congress a State cannot by its legislation destroy the right of the
United States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters, so far at least as may be necessary for the
beneficial uses of government property."'" Thus, the Court recognized
the superiority of the United States' rights to water appurtenant to its
lands.
Winters v. United States held federal reserved water rights implicit
when the United States reserved land for an Indian reservation." The
United States sued to prevent the building of a dam over the Milk River
in Montana which would have diminished the flow of that river for the
use of the Belknap Indian reservation.' 9 The Court decided that the reservation of land for the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine tribes implied a
reservation of sufficient water from the Milk River for the Indians to
subsist as an agricultural people.' 0 This decision followed the federal
13. Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 10, at 37.
14. 661 F Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 1987), enforcing and modifying sub nom. Sierra Club v. Block,
622 F. Supp. 842 (1985).

15. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 703. A second limitation on states' use of water is "the superior power of the General
Government to secure the uninterrupted navigability of all navigable streams within the limits of
the United States." Id.
18. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
19. Id. at 565.
20. Id. at 576.
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policy and the perceived Indian desire to change their nomadic habits
and "become a pastoral people." 2 The Court rejected the argument that
when Montana became a state, sometime after the creation of the Belknap
reservation, any reservation of water was nullified.22 The Court quoted
from Rio Grande Ditch & IrrigationCo.: "The power of the Government
to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state
laws is not denied, and could not be." 23
Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, known also as Pelton Dam,24
expanded the doctrine of federal reserved water rights beyond the realm
of Indian reservations. The State of Oregon challenged the authority of
the Federal Power Commission to grant a license to construct a hydroelectric dam on reserved lands of the United States on the Deschutes
River.25 In holding that the commission had the authority to grant the
license,26 the Court explained that this authority arose from the Property
Clause and depended on the United States' ownership and control over
the reserved lands on which the project was to be located. 27
The Court distinguished between "reservations" and "public lands." 28
Under the Federal Power Act "reservations" are not subject to private
appropriation and disposal under public land laws, while "public lands"
are subject to such appropriation and disposal. 29 This distinction also
discounted the State of Oregon's argument that the Acts of July 26, 1866,- o
July 9, 1870,3'and the Desert Land Act of 1877,32 precluded or restricted
the Federal Power Commission's authority to act without a state's approval." The Court stated it had previously held that the Desert Land
Act "severed, for purposes of private acquisition, soil and water rights
on public lands, and provided that such water rights were to be acquired
in the manner provided by the law of the State of location. "' The Court
then emphasized that the three acts applied to public lands, but when a
specific reservation is made, they are no longer applicable.35
21. Id.
22. Id. at 577.
23. Id.
24. 349 U.S. 435 (1955) [hereinafter Pelton Dam].
25. Id. at 437.
26. Id. at 447.
27. id. at 442-43. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl.2. If the reserved water rights doctrine is a creature
of the courts, it is because of the plenary powers given to Congress under the Property Clause. In
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) a unanimous Court reasserted Congress' complete
power over its public lands under the Property Clause. The Court gave the clause an expansive
reading holding that it gave Congress the power "to protect Wildlife on public lands, state law
notwithstanding." id. at 546 (emphasis added).
28. Pelton Dam, 349 U.S. at 443-44.
29. Id.
30. Ch. 262, §9, 14 Stat. 253 (current version at 43 U.S.C. §661 (1982)).
31. Ch. 235, §6, 16 Stat. 218 (current version at 43 U.S.C. §661 (1982)).
32. Ch. 107, § 1,19 Stat. 377 (current version at 43 U.S.C. §321 (1982)).
33. Pelton Dam, 349 U.S. at 446-47.
34. Id. at 448 (citing California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 195 U.S.
142 (1935)).
35. Id. at 448.
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Arizona v. California again expanded the doctrine of federal reserved
water rights.36 Arizona involved the adjudication of the waters of the
Colorado River and its tributaries.37 Among the issues facing the Court
were the United States' water rights claims for several Indian reservations
in Arizona and Nevada.3" The Court approved the Special Master's conclusion that when the United States created the reservations it reserved
"enough water to irrigate the irrigable portions of the reserved lands.""
The Court rejected Arizona's arguments that the federal government
had no power to reserve waters after Arizona became a state. 4 The broad
powers of Congress to regulate navigable waters under the Commerce
Clause and to regulate federal public lands under the Property Clause
include the power to reserve water.4 The Court also approved, without
much discussion, the portion of the Special Master's report that recognized federal reserved water rights for the Lake Mead National Recreation
Area, the Havasu Lake National Wildlife Refuge, and the Gila National
Forest.42
Cappaertv. United States refined the doctrine of federal reserved water
rights.43 In Cappaert, the United States disputed the extent of a rancher's
right to use groundwater from the same source supplying Devil's Hole,
a limestone cavern in Nevada, which had been withdrawn by the United
States as a national monument." The question was whether the reservation
of Devil's Hole carried with it rights to unappropriated water. " The United
States sued to enjoin Cappaert from pumping water for irrigation on
private land near the monument, alleging that when reserving Devil's
Hole, the United States "reserved the unappropriated waters appurtenant
to the land to the extent necessary for the requirements and purposes of
the reservation. "'
The Court stated that the reserved water rights doctrine applied to
"Indian reservations and other federal enclaves, encompassing water rights
in navigable and nonnavigable streams." 47 In determining whether there
are implicit water rights in specific reservations of land, intent should be
36. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
37. Id. at 551. Arizona had sued California over the interpretations of the Boulder Canyon Project

Act as to the use of the river's waters. Later, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and the United States
also became parties. The Court had before it a Special Master's Report which had adjudicated the
rights of the various parties. The Court approved most of the Special Master's findings and conclusions.
38. Id. at 595. The United States asserted claims for the Chemeheuvi, Cocopah, Yuma, Colorado
River, and Fort Mohave Indian reservations.
39. Id. at 596.
40. Id. at 597.
41. Id. at 597-98.

42. Id. at 595, 601.
43. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
44. Id. at 135.
45. Id. at 131.
46. Id. at 133-35. The United States alleged that Cappaert's use of water had lowered the water
level at Devil's Hole and that this was threatening the survival of a unique species of fish.
47. id. at 138.
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inferred if the water is necessary to accomplish the purposes of the reservations." The Court added that since the reservation of Devil's Hole
specifically mentioned the protection of the pool and the pool being a
body of water, it followed that water was explicitly reserved. 9 The Court
cautioned, however, that under the implied reservation doctrine, only the
amount of water necessary for the purpose of the reservation was reserved.5"
In holding that water was reserved for Devil's Hole, the Court also
stated that the United States could protect its water "from subsequent
diversion, whether the diversion is of surface or ground water." 5 Based
on its holding in Pelton Dam that the Desert Land Act did not apply to
water rights of federal reservations, the Court rejected the argument that
the United States had to perfect its water rights according to state law."
The Court concluded that when the United States reserved Devil's Hole
it acquired water rights sufficient to maintain the levels of the pool and
the purposes of the reservation."
In 1978, the Court narrowed the scope of the reserved water rights
doctrine as applied to national forests in United States v. New Mexico,
stating that federal reserved water rights could be implied only for reservation purposes that were primary, as opposed to secondary purposes.'
The Court affirmed a New Mexico Supreme Court decision which held
that when the United States set aside the Gila National Forest, it reserved
water" that was necessary for the withdrawal of the land, but that the
primary purposes did not include "recreation, aesthetics, wildlife preservation, or cattle grazing. "56
The Court determined that under the Organic Administration Act of
1897 which created the national forests," national forests were originally
reserved for the purposes of preserving favorable water flows and furnishing a continuous supply of timber.5" The Organic Act expressed no
48. Id. at 139.
49. Id. at 140.
50. Id. at 141.
51. Id. at 142-43. The Court stated that "groundwater and surface water are physically interrelated
as integral parts of the hydrologic cycle." Id. at 142 (citing C. Corker, Groundwater Law, Management and Administration xxiv (National Water Commission Legal Study No. 6, 1971)).
52. Id. at 143-44.
53. Id. at 147.
54. 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978).
55. The water rights at issue were the rights to the Mimbres River and its tributaries. ld. at 69798. The water fights to the Gila River were adjudicated in Arizona v. California, 378 U.S. 594-95,
601 (1962).
56. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at698, aff g Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 90 N.M.
410, 564 P.2d 615 (1977). The United States had appealed a state district court decision which had
denied the existence of reserved water rights for minimum instream flows and stockwatering purposes.
New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 704.
57. 16 U.S.C. §475 (1982).
58. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 706-07.
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concern as to the preservation of fish and wildlife within the national
forests. 9 The Court rejected the contention that the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA)W implied reserved rights in addition
to those implied in the 1897 Organic Act.
While MUSYA may have broadened the purposes for which the national
forests were administered, these purposes were secondary.62 The Court
based this conclusion on statutory language: "[tihe purposes . . .are
declared to be supplemental to, but not in derogation of, the purposes
for which the national forests were established ....,' The Court noted
that the doctrine of reserved water rights is "built on implication and is
an exception to Congress' explicit deference to state water law in other
areas. "' Furthermore, because there was no legislative history to suggest
otherwise, the Congress did not intend to reserve water for these secondary
purposes when it enacted MUSYA.65 Thus New Mexico narrowed the
scope of the federal reserved water rights doctrine by limiting implied
rights to a reservation's primary purposes.
THE WILDERNESS ACT OF 1964
The Wilderness Act of 1964 (the Act)' was enacted after eight years
of deliberation in Congress. Although the idea of preserving public lands
in their natural state had long been an objective of the federal government,
a majority of the lands intended to be protected had not been granted
statutory recognition. 67 Congress recognized that "[a] statutory framework for the preservation of wilderness would permit long-range planning
and assure that no future administrator could arbitrarily or capriciously
either abolish wilderness areas that should be retained or make wholesale
designations of additional areas in which use would be limited."6
Congress perceived the need to establish a separate and distinct National
Wilderness Preservation System in order to:
assure that an increasing population ...does not occupy and modify
all areas within the United States and its possessions, leaving no
lands designated for preservation and protection in their natural condition, it is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to secure
59. ld. at 711.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
News
68.

16 U.S.C. §528 (1982).
New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 713.
Id. at 713-15.
ld. at 713 (quoting 16 U.S.C. §528 (1982)) (emphasis added).
Id. at 715.
Id.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1982).
H.R. Rep. No. 1538, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprintedin 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
3616.
Id.. reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3616-17.
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for the American people ofpresent andfuture generationsthe benefits
of an enduring resource of wilderness.69

Lands must be designated as "wilderness areas" in accordance with the
Act or subsequent legislation.7" And the areas will be administered in
such a way as to "leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment
as wilderness."'"
The Act provides that the lands will continue to-be managed by the
department or agency having jurisdiction before they were included as
"wilderness areas."" The Act defines wilderness as "an area where the
earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man
himself is a visitor who does not remain." 73 The Act prohibits commercial
enterprises and permanent roads within the wilderness areas with few
exceptions; it also prohibits the use of motor vehicles, motorboats, motorized equipment and the landing of aircraft. 74 Mining activity is to be
gradually phased out, although prospecting is allowed if compatible with
the preservation of the wilderness.75
The Act has two provisions relating to water. One allows the president
to authorize prospecting for water resources in designated wilderness areas
for such purposes as reservoirs and power projects, and "other facilities
needed in the public interest." 76 The other water provision, and the one
subject of much controversy is Section 4(d)(7) entitled "State water laws
exemption." 77 The official legislative report on the Act is silent as to the
significance of this provision.78
ANALYSIS
In the memorandum issued on July 27, 1988, Interior Solicitor Ralph
W. Tarr concluded, based interalia on his interpretation of two provisions
of the Wilderness Act, that there were no implied reserved rights in
wilderness areas. 79 First, Tarr concluded that the state water laws pro-

vision, Section 4(d)(7),

0

specifically disclaims any new reserved water

69. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (emphasis added).
70. id.
71. Id.

72. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(b). The designated wilderness areas would thus be managed by the Department of Agriculture or the Department of the Interior.
73. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c).
74. Id.
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(2), (3); see also, H.R. 1538, supra note 67, at 9-10, reprinted in 1964
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3618.

76. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4).

77. Wilderness Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 890, 895 (codifed at 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(6) (1982)).
78. See H.R. 1538, supra note 67, at 7, reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
3615. The legislative history cited by Solicitor Tarr is not the official history, referring instead to
legislative reports, debates, and statements on prior wilderness bills which were not enacted.
79. Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 10, at 37.
80. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(6).
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rights as evidenced from the language of the provision and the Act's
legislative history."' Second, he concluded that the purposes of the Act
as evinced from Section 4(a), 2 are secondary to the prior reservation
purposes of national parks or national forests, and as such cannot support
an implied reservation of water rights following the United States v. New
Mexico holding.8 3
THE SOLICITOR'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 4(d)(7)
The solicitor concluded that the Section 4(d)(7) language, "[niothing
in this Chapter shall constitute an express or implied claim or denial on
the part of the Federal Government as to exemption from State water
laws," specifically disclaimed any reserved water rights accompanying
wilderness areas.84 According to the solicitor, Congress added this provision to the wilderness bill to assuage the concerns of western states
that the bill would form the basis for additional federal reserved water
rights.85 The solicitor supported this reading in part: with a statement
86
made by Senator Humphrey in 1958 recognizing these western concerns;
by testimony from a California state official before a senate committee
considering the bill about California's concerns; 7 and by Congress' reaction to the Pelton Dam decision.8 8 Western senators were so disgruntled
with Pelton Dam that legislation was introduced to overrule it, as well
as to revoke all existing federal water rights reservations. 9
The solicitor also supported his opinion with a 1958 report which had
been prepared for and introduced into the record by Senator Neuberger
and which stated in part "[Section 4(d)(7)] has been added as a clarification that would protect the California Department of Water Resources
and any other State or other agency from any misuse of the wilderness
bill in connection with water programs."' The solicitor drew an analogy
to a later bill introduced in 1979 by Senator Church to designate certain
lands in Idaho as wilderness areas and which contained the identical
81. Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 10, at 8-9.
82. Wilderness Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 890, 893 (codified at 16 U.S.C. 1133(a) (1982)).
83. Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 10, at 36 (referring to United States v. New Mexico, 438

U.S. at 696).
84. Id. at 15 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(6)).
85. Id. at 10.
86. id. (citing 104 Cong. Rec. 11,555 (1958) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)).
87. Id. at 11-12 (citing Hearings on S. 1176 Before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 286 (1957)).
88. Id. at II n. 14 (citing Hearings on S. 863 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and Reclamation
of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 12-13 (citing 104 Cong. Rec. 6344 (1958) (statement of Sen. Neuberger)). The report,
entitled Improvements in the Wilderness Bill, was prepared by Dr. Howard Zahniser, a representative
of Trustees for Conservation.
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language of Section 4(d)(7). 9 Senator Church explained the inclusion of
language in the bill as an affirmation of the State of Idaho's jurisdiction
over the water resources and fish and game within the wilderness areas.92
Thus, the solicitor concluded that Section 4(d)(7) disclaimed any new
reserved water rights based on legislative history and intent. It bears
noting that most of the referenced legislative history dates to the late
1950s, long before the wilderness bill became actual law, and that the
official legislative history of the bill that became the Wilderness Act did
not discuss Section 4(d)(7) at all. 93 The solicitor also relied on the interpretation and intent of a subsequent Congress in referring to other legislation. In doing so, the solicitor ran contrary to the Court's admonition
that "[tihe views of a subsequent Congress of course afford no controlling
basis from which to infer the purposes of an earlier Congress."'
The solicitor stated that Section 4(d)(7) meant to retain existing federal
reserve water rights.95 According to the solicitor, the "no denial" was
added to the "no claim" language "to safeguard federal reserved water
rights then existing for park, forest and Indian purposes."' This was
demonstrated by the legislative history that Congress did not intend to
"reopen the issue in relation to those rights already recognized." '97
The solicitor also suggested that Congress added the "no denial" language as a reaction to the state of California's argument that the wilderness
legislation should disclaim all federal exemptions to state law.9" The
solicitor conceded, however, that there was no direct legislative history
on point and instead referred to parallel legislative history."
Another way to interpret Section 4(d)(7) is by looking at prior legislative history or statutes. A parallel could have been drawn to the Supreme
Court's interpretation of Section 8 of the Reclamation Act"°° in California
v. United States.10 The Court held that this language was a reflection of
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 14-15 (referring to S. 2009, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979)).
Id. at 15 (citing 126 Cong. Rec. 17,180 (1980) (statement of Sen. Church)).
H.R. 1538, supra note 67, at 7, reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3615.
Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 10, at 27 (citing Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 87

n. 4 (1968)).
95. Id. at 15.
96. Id. at 15-16.
97. Id. at 16.
98. Id. (citing Hearings on S. 1176, supra note 87, at 286-87).
99. Id. at 16-17 (referring to the language in the bills introduced to overturn Pelton Dam).
100. 43 U.S.C. §383 (1982).
101. 438 U.S. 645 (1978). The language at issue was Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902,
which reads in part:
[Nlothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or to in any way
interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use,
or distribution of water used in irrigation . . . and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying
out the provisions of this Act, shall proceed in conformity with such laws. ...
id. at 650 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 383). The United States Bureau of Reclamation sought a declaratory
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"cooperative federalism" and that the Reclamation Act was enacted against
the background of a "consistent thread of purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Congress."' 2 The language of Section 8,
however, is much more explicit and less subject to differing interpretation
than the language at issue in the Wilderness Act. Section 8 positively
states that nothing will be construed to affect or "in any way interfere
with the laws of any State. . . ... Section 8 demonstrates that when Congress wants to defer to state water rights, it can do so unequivocally.
The solicitor addressed and rejected other interpretations of Section
4(d)(7) which suggested that: (1) it was neutral and intended to preserve
the status quo; (2) it was a compromise; and (3) the later use of the same
language in the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act led to the conclusion that
federal reserved water rights were reserved in wilderness areas."°3
The first contention-that the language was neutral-was proposed in
the Krulitz Opinion which claimed that the "or denial" part of the section
cancelled the "or claim" part, thus making the meaning neutral. " Krulitz
further stated that the neutral meaning equalled the preservation of the
status quo, and that preserving the status quo signified the application of
the federal reserved water rights doctrine."
The solicitor dismissed this interpretation based on the principle that
it "is an eggregious [sic] vielati.)n of the cardinal principle of statutory
construction that congressional enactments are not to be relegated to
surplusage if there is a way of giving meaning to them."' Further, he
read the legislative history of the period to be contrary to the contention
that preserving the status quo was equivalent to including the doctrine
of implicitly reserved water rights. 7 According to the solicitor, Congress
had been attempting to overturn or modify Pelton Dam, and it was commonly understood that Congress desired to restore the primacy of state
law."10 Finally, 'the solicitor argued that even if Congress intended the
section to be neutral, it did not necessarily follow that reserved water
judgment that it could impound water necessary for federal reclamation without complying with
(California) law. The Court held that the language and legislative history of Section 8 indicated that
"Congress intended to defer to the substance, as well as the form, of state water law." Id. at 675.
The Solicitor's Opinion did cite California v. United States, but in another context. The solicitor
referred to the confusion which would result if the appropriation of water were not under the control
of state law. Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 10, at 34 (citing 438 U.S. at 667).
102. California, 438 U.S. at 650, 653.
103, Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 10, at 20.
104. Id. (citing Krulitz Opinion, supra note 8, 607 n. 99). It should be pointed out that Krulitz'
neutrality argument was made in the context of examining the identical language of and the application
of reserved rights to the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.
105. Id. at 20-21 (citing Krulitz Opinion, supra note 8, at 610 & n. 106).
106. Id. at 21-22.
107. Id. at 22.
108. Id. at 22-23.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

(Vol. 29

rights were created. " Reserved water rights, being creatures of legislative
intent, could not be implied if Congress was neutral. "o
The solicitor's argument on the status quo is faulty because however
much Congress desired to overturn Pelton Dam and restore the primacy
of state law, all legislation to that effect failed to be enacted. In addition,
the status quo which should be examined is the one prevailing at the time
the Wilderness Act was enacted. The solicitor made no references to what
the congressional feeling was in 1964 as to the doctrine of federal reserved
water rights.
While the solicitor may have discounted the neutral interpretation of
Section 4(d)(7), this interpretation found support in SierraClub v. Lyng. "'
The court thought that the language was clear and therefore there was no
need to look at legislative history. 2 The court concluded that the language
was meant to preserve the status quo and stated: "By its own terms,
Section 4(d)(7) does not purport to work any substantive change in the
rights parties may acquire under the various doctrines of water law,
including the reserved rights doctrine. "" 3 The court bolstered its argument
by citing the Krulitz Opinion which had similarly interpreted Section
4(d)(7)."14 And the court added that Section 4(d)(7) did not change the
court's conclusion in Sierra Club v. Block" 5 that federal reserved water
rights were implied in wilderness areas." 6
The solicitor rejected the second contention that Section 4(d)(7) was
intended as a compromise between "the reserved water rights doctrine
and the question of water improvement construction within wilderness
areas.""' 7 The solicitor found there was no evidence to support this view
in the published record or committee files. "' And there was evidence that
notwithstanding the inclusion of the Section 4(d)(7) language, opponents
of the wilderness bill were very concerned about the curtailment of water
improvements in wilderness areas if the legislation was enacted.'
The solicitor rejected the third theory that the language could be ex109. Id. at 24.

110. Id. at 24-25. The solicitor stated that if reserved water rights could be implied from congressional neutrality, this disregarded the Supreme Court's admonition in United States v. New Mexico

that Congress usually deferred to state water allocation. Id. at 24 n. 38 (citing 438 U.S. at 715).
111. 661 F. Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 1987).
112. Id. at 1493.
113. Id. at 1494.

114. Id. at 1495 (citing Krulitz Opinion, supra note 8, at 610).
115. 622 F. Supp. 842 (1985), enforced and modified sub nona. Sierra Club v. Lyng, 661 F.
Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 1987).
116. Lyng, 661 F Supp. at 1495.
117. Solictor's Opinion, supra note 10, at 25. Under this view, there was acommittee agreement
to negate guarantees of state water rights in exchange for access for water improvements in wilderness
areas, a quid pro quo.

118. Id.
119. ld. at 26 (citing Hearings on S. 174 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the House

Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 58-61 (1961) (referring to the dialogue
between Sen. Goldwater and a Forest Service official)).
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plained in terms of the identical language in the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act of 1964.2' The solicitor argued that congressional intent could not
be divined from a later Congress. 2 ' The solicitor indicated the identical
language was part of a section entitled "Compensation for Water Rights"
which was intended to ensure that vested water rights were not taken
without just compensation. 22
' According to the solicitor, the statutes had
different historical backgrounds; the Wilderness Act was drafted when
the doctrine of reserved water rights was a new issue, while the Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act was drafted when the doctrine was well established."23 Further, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act contained an express
reservation of water rights and thus the addition of the "claim or denial"
language was made to prevent the created rights from eliminating vested
water rights. 24
'
Having concluded that Section 4(d)(7) disclaimed any new federal
reserved water rights, the solicitor attempted to bolster his conclusion
with his interpretation of the Wilderness Act's purposes.

WILDERNESS ACT'S PURPOSES: SECONDARY OR PRIMARY?
In accordance with the holding in United States v. New Mexico, the
solicitor examined the purposes of wilderness area reservations under the
Act to determine whether they are primary or secondary to the purposes
for which the underlying reservations, whether parks or forests, were
created; if primary, federal reserved water rights would be implied; if
secondary, they would not. The solicitor compared the language of Section
4(a) of the Act with the language of MUSYA:
The purposes of [the Wilderness Act] are hereby declared to be within
and supplemental to the purposes for which national forests and units
of the national park . . . are established and administered.
to
[t]he purposes of [the MUSYA] are declared to be supplemental to,
but not in derogation of, the purposes for which the national forests
were established .... 1
120. Id. at 27 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1271).
121. Id. at 27.
122. Id. at 27 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1284(b)).
123. Id. at 30. It is difficult to comprehend why the four years between the enactment of the
Wilderness Act (1964) and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (1968) would make such a difference.
After all, Pelton Dam was decided nine years before the Wilderness Act was enacted and Arizona
v. California, which reinforced the doctrine of federal reserved water rights, was decided in 1962,
hardly making the doctrine a "new" issue.

124. Id. at 28.
125. Id. at 32 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1133(a)).
126. Id. at 31 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 528).
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The use of the word "supplemental" in both acts convinced the solicitor
that like the purposes of MUSYA the purposes of the Wilderness Act are
secondary to the purposes of the national parks or national forests."2 7 The
Act's specification that its administration not interfere with the purposes
of the national forests or lower the standards for the management of the
park system units, demonstrated to the solicitor that wilderness purposes
are secondary. 2 ' The Act's legislative history also provided some support
to the solicitor's reading. 29
In reaching this conclusion, the solicitor concluded that "within and
supplemental" means the same as "supplemental to but not in derogation
of." The comparison is flawed because "within" and "not in derogation
of" do not have the same meaning. "Within" more probably means
included as a coequal or "is a part of." In contrast, "not in derogation
of" means that if a choice is to be made as to which purpose must stand
when there is conflict, MUSYA must be considered secondary. Further,
the "within and supplemental" language can imply that the purposes are
on the same level as those purposes which they supplement. The solicitor
also presupposed that the purposes of the wilderness areas"3 would be
in sharp collision with the purposes of the national forests and national
parks, and that this necessarily meant wilderness purposes were secondary.
By describing the Wilderness Act as a management statute,' 3' the solicitor ignored Congress' vital concern that the preservation of wilderness
areas was paramount:
[It] is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress to secure for
the American people of present and future generations the benefits
of an enduring resource of wilderness. For this purpose there is hereby
established a National Wilderness Preservation System to be composed of federally owned areas designated by Congress as "wilder127. Id.at 32.
128. Id. at 32-33 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1133(a)(1), (3)).
129. Id. at 32-33. The solicitor cited language which described the Act as a management statute:
"[The Act] simply establishes the criteria under which our wilderness areas will be managed so we
can assure their preservation." Id. at 32 n. 43 (citing 109 Cong. Rec. 5942-43 (1963) (statement of
Sen. McGovern)). It should be noted that Senator McGovern made this statement in the context of
explaining how the Act would not require any new expenditures.
130. It bears repeating that the Wilderness Act mandated the preservation of wilderness areas
"unimpaired for future use and enjoyment" and that it set out a series of prohibited activities and
uses in the areas, such as motorized equipment and commercial enterprises, with few exceptions.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1131(a), 1133(c). And even if these prohibitions may be in conflict with national park
or national forest purposes, the argument has not been made that they therefore do not apply.
131. The solicitor compared the purposes of the Wilderness Act with the purposes of the Federal
Land Management and Policy Act (FLMPA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982), enacted in 1976, to
further advance the contention that the Wilderness Act purposes are secondary. Solicitor's Opinion,
supra note 10, at 35-36. A comparison of the Wilderness Act and FLMPA demonstrates that while
FLMPA is a land management statute concerned with multiple uses, the Wilderness Act is concerned
with one matter only-the preservation of the wilderness.
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ness areas," and these shall be administered for the use and enjoyment
I ..as wilderness.' 32

The view that the Act's purposes were intended to be paramount and

primary was central in Sierra Club v. Block.'33
Sierra Club v. Block analyzed Congress' intent in enacting the Wilderness Act. The court first examined the purpose section of the Act in
conjunction with the Act's definition of wilderness and the mandate that
wilderness areas be devoted to specific public purposes. "' The Act's

purposes were repeatedly explained by congressional language:
[Tihe purpose of the act seeks to prevent exploitation of these lands
by humans in our increasing population and the detrimental effects
on these lands of our mechanical expansion. This act guarantees to
this generation and future generations of Americans the enduring
resources of the wilderness.

and
[ojf all the pieces of legislation that have been passed, in terms
of looking to the future, . . . in terms of preservation of the great
resources of America and the need of a growing population to know
something of the great out of doors, untouched and unscathed, nothing is more significant than this piece of legislation."

The court also examined the "within and supplemental" language in
conjunction with the mandate that nothing in the Act should interfere
with the purposes of the national forests.' 37 The court concluded that
wilderness purposes were primary because preservation of wilderness
areas "actually enhances water quality and quantity;" and preserving the
watershed is equivalent to preserving favorable water flows, one of the
primary purposes of the national forests."'3 The court then distinguished
United States v. New Mexico:
132. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a).
133. 622 F. Supp. 842 (1985) enforced and modified sub noram.
Sierra Club v. Lyng, 661 F Supp.
t490 (D. Colo. 1987). The solicitor relied on New Mexico v. Molybdenum Corp. of America, CV
9780-C (D.N.M. 1988) to counteract the significance of Sierra Club v. Block's holding that reserved
water rights were implied in wilderness areas. The district court in Molybdenum without opinion
approved the Special Master's report which dealt with various reserved rights including a claim
under the Wilderness Act. The court denied this claim based on its reading of 16 U.S.C. 1133 as
a disclaimer negating "any intent by Congress to make a reservation of water rights in derogation
of state water laws," and by reference to MUSYA and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. The Special
Master did not give any extensive analysis for this conclusion. Report of Special Master, 8-11,
Molybdenum, CV 9780-C.
134. Block, 622 F. Supp. at 858 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131(a), (c), 1133(b)).
135. Id. at 858 (citing 110 Cong. Rec. 17444 (1964) (statement of Rep. Libonati)).
136. Id. at 859 (citing 110 Cong. Rec. 20602 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)).
137. Id.
138. Id.
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[Tihe Wilderness Act is not a land-management statute. Nor does
the Act constitute an attempt to add to the primary purposes of
existing reservations, such as the national forest, as the MUSYA did
in New Mexico. Rather, the Wilderness Act is the initial legislation
creating an entirely new reservation of federal lands. 39
Thus Sierra Club v. Block concluded that the Act's purposes were primary
because wilderness purposes coincided with watershed protection, a primary national forest purpose. Further, the legislative intent behind the
Wilderness Act made it clear that the purposes were primary and "crucial"
as compared to the purposes of the MUSYA (which New Mexico found
secondary). "
While the solicitor had used his interpretation of wilderness purposes
to bolster the conclusion that reserved water rights were not implied for
wilderness areas, SierraClub v. Block used its interpretation of wilderness
purposes to arrive at the opposite conclusion. Both the Solicitor's Opinion
and Block cited congressional language which could support either position. In light of the plain statutory language describing the purposes of
the Wilderness Act as preserving the wilderness for generations to come,
Sierra Club v. Block's interpretation of the Act's purposes is more persuasive.
However, Sierra Club v. Block may have too narrowly interpreted the
purposes of the Wilderness Act. Under the court's analysis wilderness
purposes are primary only because they ultimately benefit the protection
of the watershed. The Wilderness Act however, can be read to imply that
wilderness purposes are primary without having to coincide exactly with
the same primary purposes of a national forest, or of a national park,
whichever the case may be. The Act says the preservation of wilderness
is a purpose "within" the overall national parks or national forests schemea coequal and supplemental purpose. It does not say the wilderness purposes can never be "in derogation" of the primary purposes of the national
parks or national forests. The Act has independent and primary purposes,
the most significant one being the clear mandate to preserve designated
wilderness areas "unimpaired" for the future.
CONCLUSION
The solicitor's conclusion that no federal reserved water rights are
implied in the Wilderness Act is forceful. While the solicitor's interpretation of the Act's purposes as secondary is flawed and ignores the thrust
of the Act, his interpretation of the "no claim or denial" language is
139. Id. at 860.
140. Id. at 861.
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persuasive. However, this interpretation can be countered with the view
that the language only meant to preserve the status quo. Because Congress
enacted the Wilderness Act when the doctrine of federal reserved water
rights was in full force, Congress could only have meant that to preserve
the status quo was to implicitly reserve water for wilderness areas.
Even though the Solicitor's Opinion does not have the force of law,
it is a victory for the state rights activists and developers. Inasmuch as
the opinion was approved by the attorney general, it should control policy
at all the departments which administer wilderness areas. And it will
prevent these agencies from claiming federal reserved water rights, unless
they were ordered to do so by the courts. By concluding that Congress
did not create federal reserved water rights when it enacted the Wilderness
Act of 1964, the federal government when applying for water rights will
need to comply with state water laws just as any other user. The Solicitor's
Opinion follows the view that "[w]here Congress has expressly addressed
the question of whether federal entities must abide by state water law, it
has almost invariably deferred to the state law."''
New Mexico, however, also reaffirmed Congress' power to implicitly
reserve water rights "where water is necessary to fulfill the very purposes
for which a federal reservation was created."' 42 Congress need not say
the magic words that water rights are reserved, but only say or imply
that the particular reservation's purposes are primary.
The question ultimately will be one of congressional intent in the
Wilderness Act as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. While
the Court may agree with the solicitor's interpretation of Section 4(d)(7),
it may find the solicitor's interpretation of wilderness purposes less convincing. The Court may be persuaded that the Wilderness Act's mandate
of preserving the wilderness "unimpaired" for the future includes the
obligation to preserve water rights necessary for realizing this. In his
dissent in United States v. New Mexico, Justice Powell stated:

I do not agree, however, that the forests which Congress intended
to "improve and protect" are the still, silent, lifeless places envisioned by the Court. In my view, the forests consist of the birds,
animals, and fish-the wildlife-that inhabit them, as well as the
trees, flowers, shrubs, and grasses. I therefore would hold that the
United States is entitled to so much water as is necessary to sustain
the wildlife of the forests, as well as the plants. 43
Even more than Justice Powell's envisioned protection of forests, the
141. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 702 (1978).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 719 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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protection of wilderness areas as conceived of in the Wilderness Act
includes the protection of the wildlife and the flora--of the land in its
natural state. The whole thrust of the Wilderness Act, its sine qua non,
is to protect the land "unimpaired," and it only stands to reason that in
some instances water is essential to accomplishing these purposes.
M. GLORIA TRISTANI

